

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UR, US, MPOL, SALT, MBFR, PARM, PEPR
SUBJECT: MARCH 29 MEETING WITH KORNIYENKO AND OGARKOV

SUMMARY: ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR, CODEL PRICE MET FOR FOUR HOURS WITH KORNIYENKO AND OGARKOV MARCH 29 IN MOST USEFUL MEETING ON THE TRIP. IN OPENING STATEMENTS KORNIYENKO LAID OUT THE THREE PREREQUISITES FOR GOOD U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND OGARKOV LISTED SOVIET CONCERNS ON SPECIFIC SALT ISSUES. THE HASC MEMBERS FOLLOWED UP WITH A LONG SERIES OF QUESTIONS ON SALT-RELATED ISSUES (BACK-FIRE, ICBM MODERNIZATION, CRUISE MISSILES, NON-CIRCUMVENTION), AND A VARIETY OF OTHER ARMS CONTROL TOPICS (MBFR, CD, NEUTRON BOMB, CW, US AND SOVIET THREATS). CONGRESSMAN WAXMAN, A NON-COMMITTEE MEMBER, MADE A STATEMENT ON THE SHCHARANSKIY CASE AND ITS NEGATIVE EFFECT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. OGARKOV AND KORNIYENKO TOOK ALL THE QUESTIONS AND ATTEMPTED TO REPLY BY SUBJECT, DIVIDING
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THE WORK. THEY GAVE IMPRESSION OF BEING REASONABLE SOVIET OFFICIALS TRYING TO EXPLAIN SOVIET POSITIONS AND THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE. HASC MEMBERS WERE IMPRESSED WITH THE PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY THAT OF OGARKOV, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY UNCONVINCED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOVIET POSITIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. KORNIYENKO OPENING STATEMENT: FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, G. M. KORNIYENKO, SAID THAT GOOD SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS ARE NOW MANDATORY, THEN LISTED HIS THREE "OBLIGATORY CONDITIONS" FOR SUCH RELATIONS:

-- EACH MUST CONSIDER THE OTHER AS AN EQUAL PARTNER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE THEY LIKE EACH OTHER;

-- THERE SHOULD BE NO INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS BECAUSE EACH HAS DIFFERENT CONCEPTS, EVEN ABOUT MORAL ISSUES, AND THESE DIFFERENCES SHOULD NOT BECOME OBSTACLES NOR SHOULD THEY CAUSE PROBLEMS IN ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS; ALSO, HE ADDED, NO LINKAGE TO OTHER ISSUES;

-- THERE SHOULD BE STABILITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT CHANGES EVERY 2 OR 4 YEARS BECAUSE OF U.S. ELECTIONS. THE RELATIONSHIP IS BUILT ON STATE INTERESTS AND STATE INTERESTS ARE NOT THAT MUTABLE.

2. OGARKOV STATEMENT: FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE MARSHAL N. V. OGARKOV REVIEWED BRIEFLY THE HISTORY OF SALT WITH THE ACCENT ON VLADIVOSTOK AND THE SEPTEMBER 1977 WASHINGTON MEETINGS. HE STATED THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PROGRESS AT THIS POINT, BUT ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED THAT U.S. WAS NOW CAUSING AN "ARTIFICIAL SLOWDOWN." HE CLAIMED THE U.S. SIDE AFTER THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS HAD TABLED A PROPOSAL TO PERMIT
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CRUISE MISSILES ON ANY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT INCLUDING TRANSPORTS AND TO INCLUDE UNDER THE RUBRIC OF HEAVY BOMBERS TANKERS AND ASW PLANES. THE SECOND ISSUE WHICH WAS CREATING PROBLEMS, ACCORDING TO OGARKOV, WAS BACKFIRE. THIS, HE SAID, "PUZZLED US" SINCE HE FELT THAT IT HAD BEEN SETTLED LONG AGO WHEN THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THE RADIUS OF OPERATION OF THIS AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT GIVE IT SUFFICIENT RANGE TO REACH THE U.S. AND WHEN THE SOVIETS AGREED NOT TO INCREASE ITS NORMAL PRODUCTION RATE.

3. THE THIRD ISSUE WHICH HE CONSIDERED A "BIG QUESTION" WAS THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL TO STOP THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVEN A SINGLE RV ICBM. HE ARGUED THE SOVIETS REQUIRE THIS SYSTEM TO FILL SINGLE RV LAUNCHERS WHICH THEY HAD NOT THOUGHT NECESSARY BEFORE BUT WHICH ARE NOW REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE LOWER 820 MIRV ICBM SUBCEILING. HE STATED FLATLY THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT ACCEPT THE U.S. POSITION ON THIS ISSUE.

4. ANOTHER ISSUE WAS WHAT HE REFERRED TO AS THE AMERICAN SIDE'S "PERSISTENCE" THAT SOVIET LAUNCHER REDUCTIONS TAKE PLACE AT A FASTER RATE THAN THE SOVIETS NOW DESIRE. HE ARGUED THAT THIS WAS NOT A U.S. PROBLEM, SINCE THE U.S. WOULD ONLY HAVE TO DESTROY "SOME AIRCRAFT" WHICH ARE ALREADY RETIRED WHILE THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO DESTROY "SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS." TO CHANGE THE TIMETABLE, HE SAID, WOULD INTERFERE WITH "OTHER IMPORTANT CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AND CAUSE INTERRUPTIONS IN OUR PLANS." FINALLY, OGARKOV ADDRESSED NON-CIRCUMVENTION/

NON-TRANSFER WHICH HE SAID MUST BE DEALT WITH IN THE AGREEMENT OR THERE "CANNOT BE AN AGREEMENT."

5. AFTER TREATING MBFR IN STANDARD TERMS, OGARKOV ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND, CITING BREZHNEV'S TULA SPEECH AND ARMED FORCES 60TH ANNIVERSARY

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REMARKS, HE CLOSED WITH THE DECLARATION THAT "AS CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF I, WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY, CAN DECLARE TO YOUR DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION THAT THIS IS THE PURPOSE -- TO PROVIDE RELIABLE DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST MOTHERLAND, TO DEFEND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIALISM IN OTHER COUNTRIES, AND IN THE COUNTRIES OF FRATERNAL STATES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH. THIS IS THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY STRUCTURE."

6. BACKFIRE. THE MOST DISCUSSED ISSUE OF THE MEETING WAS, IN OGARKOV'S WORDS, THE "INFAMOUS" BACKFIRE. HASC MEMBERS POSED QUESTIONS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITY FOR IN-FLIGHT REFUELING (OGARKOV PLAYED DOWN ITS SIGNIFICANCE WITH CONTENTION THAT EVEN WITH REFUELING THE RANGE WOULD BE LESS THAN INTERCONTINENTAL); SOVIET PLANS REGARDING THE SIZE OF ITS TANKER FLEET (OGARKOV SAID "FRANKLY" THAT THERE WERE NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO INCREASE ITS SIZE); THE FORM OF THE DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD CONTAIN SOVIET ASSURANCES (OGARKOV REFERRED TO THE FORM SOVIETS HAD ALREADY PROPOSED); AND WHY THE SOVIET UNION
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HAD NOT STOPPED PRODUCTION OF THE BOMBER AS A GOOD WILL GESTURE IN REPLY TO THE U.S. DECISION ON B-1 (OGARKOV POINTED OUT THAT THE TWO WERE NOT COMPARABLE). OGARKOV

SEVERAL TIMES LISTED ASSURANCES THAT SOVIETS AGREE TO AS INCLUDING 2200 KILOMETER RADIUS OF ACTION, NO INCREASE IN CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD ENABLE IT TO REACH U.S. COAST, I.E., 5500 KMS, AND NO INCREASE IN NORMAL PRODUCTION RATE.

7. NON-CIRCUMVENTION. ASKED IF THE USSR WILL SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN SPECIFIC U.S. OBLIGATION NOT TO TRANSFER CRUISE MISSILES TO NATO ALLIES, OGARKOV REPLIED THAT SUCH QUESTIONS ARE BETTER ANSWERED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

8. NEW TYPES. IN ADDITION TO OGARKOV'S OPENING REMARKS ON THIS ISSUE, HE STATED THAT THE SINGLE RV SYSTEM WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED BE PERMITTED COULD NOT BE CONVERTED TO MIRVS BECAUSE THE BAN ON FLIGHT-TESTS OF NEW MIRVED SYSTEMS WOULD PRECLUDE TESTING.

9. CRUISE MISSILES. OGARKOV WAS ASKED WHY SOVIETS OBJECT TO U.S. ACQUISITION OF CRUISE MISSILES GIVEN FIFTEEN YEAR OLD SOVIET CAPABILITY TO REACH MAJORITY OF U.S. POPULATION WITH CRUISE MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM SUBS, MORE THAN 15 KM OFF U.S. SHORES. OGARKOV REPLIED THAT SINCE THESE MISSILES DID NOT HAVE RANGE OF 600 KMS THEY DO NOT FALL UNDER SALT LIMITATIONS.

10. VERIFICATION. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ON INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION, OGARKOV EXPRESSED FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE ADEQUACY OSQFTM VERIFICATION, WITH PROCEDURES WORKED OUT IN SALT I AND THE SCC. HE SAID THAT EXPERIENCE SINCE 1972 AND "THE ABILITY TO RESOLVE OBJECTS DOWN TO 10 CENTIMETERS" DO NOT ARGUE FOR NEED FOR
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FURTHER VERIFICATION MEANS BEYOND NTM.

11. CHEMICAL WARFARE. KORNIYENKO STATED THAT THE USSR IS READY "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE" TO CONCLUDE A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

12. NATURE OF THE U.S. THREAT. ASKED BY A MEMBER HOW THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE THE U.S. THREAT, KORNIYENKO GAVE HIS HISTORICAL EXPOSITION ON BEGINNINGS OF COLD WAR WHICH PORTRAYED THE U.S. AND NATO AS A SERIOUS MILITARY THREAT AT THAT TIME. HE ADDED THAT WITH PRESENT SOVIET DETERRENT CAPABILITY NATURE OF THAT THREAT HAS CHANGED "SOMEWHAT," BUT DANGER OF ARMED CONFLICT REMAINS.

13. CIVIL DEFENSE. AGAIN OGARKOV CLAIMED THAT U.S. EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN "PUZZLED" THE SOVIETS SINCE THEY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW ONE COULD CONSIDER CS AS A FACTOR IN THE STRATEGIC EQUATION GIVEN THE POWER OF MODERN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE COULD SUPPLY FIGURES WHICH WOULD PROVE THAT U.S. EXPENDITURES

IN CD WERE MORE THAN SOVIET AND THAT THE SCOPE OF THE
U.S. EFFORT SURPASSED THAT OF THE USSR.

14. NEUTRON BOMB. QUESTIONED WHY THE SOVIETS SUGGEST
THAT THE N-BOMB IS STRATEGIC (SIC), OGARKOV REPLIED THAT
SOVIETS DO NOT CLAIM IT IS STRATEGIC, BUT RATHER A NEW
TYPE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON WHICH SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN MDW
DISCUSSIONS. IT LOWERS THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND WILL
LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE ARMS RACE. HE REFERRED TO
THE TASS STATEMENT AS THE AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET POSITION
ON THE ISSUE.

15. MBFR. BOTH OGARKOV AND KORNIYENKO TREATED MBFR AT
LENGTH, BUT THERE WAS LITTLE OF NOTE IN THEIR REMARKS.

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KORNIYENKO STATED IN REPLY TO A QUESTION THAT "REALIS-
TICALLY" IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO FINISH MBFR BEFORE
SALT AND THAT THE QUESTION ITSELF BETRAYED AN INCLINATION
TOWARDS BELIEF THAT SALT II WOULD NOT BE CONCLUDED SOON.

16. SHCHARANSKIY CASE. THE LAST ITEM FROM THE U.S.
SIDE BEFORE THE TWO SOVIETS REPLIED TO QUESTIONS WAS A
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE WAXMAN THAT THE DENIAL OF THE
BASIC RIGHT TO EMIGRATE VIOLATED THE HELSINKI ACT AND
SOVIET SIGNATURE OF THE ACT MEANS THIS IS NO LONGER
SIMPLY A SOVIET INTERNAL ISSUE. HE STRESSED THAT, AS
ONE WHO WISHED TO SEE GOOD SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS,
THE SHCHARANSKIY CASE COULD "POISON THE POLITICAL
ATMOSPHERE" AND CAUSE SOME IN THE CONGRESS NOT TO APPROVE
SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS BECAUSE OF SOVIET NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH AN ALREADY SIGNED AGREEMENT. WAXMAN
ASKED FOR KORNIYENKO'S OR OGARKOV'S COMMENTS. KORNIYENKO
SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO RAISE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRA-
TION REGULATIONS (BUT THEN CITED CASE OF CANADIAN CP

CASTAIN) AND DID NOT THINK THAT THE DIFFERENCES IN THE
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LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF EACH NATION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED.
THE FINAL ACT HAS "NO RELEVANCE" HERE, HE STATED. THE
SHCHARANSKIY CASE IS NOW SUBJECT TO SOVIET JURISDICTION,
ONLY THE COURT CAN DECIDE IT, AND THIS SHOULD NOT BE A
SUBJECT BETWEEN US.

17. COMMENT. THE HSAC MEMBERS WERE PARTICULARLY
IMPRESSED WITH OGARKOV'S PERFORMANCE DURING THIS UNPRECE-
DENTED WESTERN EXPOSURE TO HIM. ALTHOUGH HIS (AND
KORNIYENKO'S) SUBSTANTIVE ANSWERS WERE PREDICTABLE, HE
CALMLY HANDLED ALL QUESTIONS WITH APPARENT EASE,
DEXTERITY AND EVEN A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF GOOD HUMOR. CODEL
WAS LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT HE IS NOT ONLY MASTER OF
HIS OWN PROFESSION BUT A GOOD DIPLOMAT-WARRIOR AS WELL.
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